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Abstract
The AMR (Abstract Meaning Representation) formalism for representingmeaning of natural lan-
guage sentences was not designed to deal with scope and quantifiers. By extendingAMRwith indices
for contexts and formulating constraints on these contexts, a formalism is derived that makes correct
prediction for inferences involving negation and bound variables. The attractive core predicate-
argument structure of AMR is preserved. The resulting framework is similar to that of Discourse
Representation Theory.
1 Introduction
Abstract Meaning Representation (AMR) puts emphasis on argument structure. In these notes I make
a proposal to extend AMRs with a logical dimension, in order to—from a formal semantics point of
view—correctly capture negation, quantification, and presuppositional phenomena. It is desirable to
investigate such an extension, because (i) it would make a comparison of AMR with other semantics
formalisms possible (in particular Discourse Representation Theory); (ii) it would make AMR suitable
for performing logical inferences; and (iii) it would be an important step in sharing resources for semantic
parsing. The aim is to do this in such a way that existing annotations of AMR can be relatively easily
extended with the desired extensions.
This is not the first proposal of extending AMR to handle scope phenomena (Pustejovsky et al., 2019). I
think the contribution of this paper is that this extension is simpler of nature than those proposed in Bos
(2016) and Stabler (2017). It bears similarities with the named graphs employed in Crouch and Kalouli
(2018).
The orginal AMRs cannot be used directly for drawing valid inferences. Using the simple conjunction
elimination rule (if the conjunction A and B is true, then A is true, and B is true), and assuming that
an AMR is interpreted as a conjunction of clauses, AMR will make the right predictions as long as no
negation is involved (e.g., it will yield the correct inference “Mary left” from “Mary left yesterday”).
But since, in AMR, negation is represented as a predicate rather than an operator that takes scope, it will
make wrong predications for negated sentences (e.g., it will allow the inference “Mary left” from “Mary
did not leave”. This is why AMRs need some reformulation before interpretation, and that is exactly
what Bos (2016) and Stabler (2017) propose.
Pustejovsky et al. (2019) extend AMR with a possibility of adding explicit scope relations. This exten-
sion, however, doesn’t solve a fundamental problem that AMR faces, namely the interpretation of bound
variables in quantification. Consider examples such as “every man shaved himself” or “all women want
to swim”. In AMR, where quantifiers are expressed as a predicate rather than taking scope, the result-
ing interpretations for these sentences could be paraphrased as “every man shaved every man” and “all
women want all women to swim”, which are not the meanings that the sentences express.
I argue that if we want to fix these problems, AMR requires explicit scope in their representations,
following Bos and Abzianidze (2019). In this short paper I propose a method to this by keeping the
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underlying predicate-argument structure, and adding a second, logical layer (Section 2). In Section 3, I
show a list of examples of extended AMRs that demonstrate the approach. Some loose ends are discussed
in Section 4.
2 Method
The idea is to extend the AMR with logical structure, by viewing an AMR as having two components:
one comprising basic predicate-argument structure (the original AMR), and one consisting of the logical
structure (information about logical operators such as negation and the scope they take). This is achieved
by:
1. Viewing AMR as a recursive structure, rather than interpreting it as a graph;
2. Labelling each (sub-)AMR with an index;
3. Adding constraints to the indices.
AMRs can be seen as a recursive structure by viewing every slash within an AMR as a sub-AMR. If
a (sub-)AMR contains relations, those relations will introduce nested AMRs. A constant is also an
AMR, in this definition—see Bos (2016) for details. An AMR (and all its sub-AMRs) will be labeled by
decorating the slashes with indices.
Every AMR is augmented by a set of scoping constraints on the labels. This way, a sub-AMR can be
viewed as describing a “context”. The constraints state how the contexts relate to each other. They can
be the same contexts (=), a negated context (¬), a conditional context (⇒), or a presuppositional context
(<). Colons are used to denote inclusion: l : C states that context l contains condition C . These labels
are similar in spirit to those used in underspecification formalisms as proposed by Reyle (1993), Bos
(1996), and Copestake et al. (2005). The treatment of presuppositions is inspired by Venhuizen et al.
(2013, 2018).
3 Results
Here I illustrate the idea with canonical examples involving existential and universal quantification, def-
inite descriptions, proper names, and negation.
3.1 Existential Quantification
Consider the AMR for “A dog scared a cat.” with a transitive verb and two indefinite noun phrases, where
we can identify three sub-AMRs. We index and constrain them as follows:
(e /1/ scare.v.01
:Stimulus (x /2/ dog.n.01)
:Experiencer (y /3/ cat.n.01)) {1 = 2, 1 = 3}
Here there is just one context shared by all three sub-AMRs. As equivalent alternative, the following
simplified AMR is also possible:
(e /1/ scare.v.01
:Stimulus (x /1/ dog.n.01)
:Experiencer (y /1/ cat.n.01)) {}
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3.2 Definite Description and Proper Names
A sentence like “The woman smiled.” contains a definite description triggering an existential presuppo-
sition. Presuppositions yield new contexts:
(e /1/ smile.v.01
:Agent (x /2/ woman)) {2<1}
In other words, the definite article triggers a presupposition that there is a woman (2) with respect to
context (1). Proper names can be handled similarly:
“John smiled.”
(e /1/ smile.v.01
:Agent (x /2/ person
:Name (y /2/ john))) {2<1}
The existence of a person named “John” is a presupposition for the smiling event.
3.3 Negation
“A woman didn’t smile.”
(e /1/ smile.v.01
:Agent (x /2/ woman)) {2:¬1}
“The woman didn’t smile.”
(e /1/ smile.v.01
:Agent (x /3/ woman)) {3<2,2:¬1}
Negation introduces a new (negated) context. This makes the :polarity- relation in AMR obsolete.
3.4 Universal Quantification
“Everyone smiled.”
(e /1/ smile.v.01
:Agent (x /2/ person)) {3:2=>1}
“A dog scared every cat.”
(e /1/ scare.v.01
:Stimulus (x /1/ dog.n.01)
:Experiencer (y /2/ cat.n.01)) {3:2=>1}
“Every dog scared every cat.”
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(e /1/ scare.v.01
:Stimulus (x /2/ dog)
:Experiencer (y /3/ cat)) {5:3=>4,4:2=>1}
“Every boy revised his paper.”
(e /1/ revise
:Agent (x /2/ boy)
:Patient (y /3/ paper
:Creator x)) {2=3,3<1,4:2=>1}
4 Discussion
In this section I discuss some loose ends: the issue of inferred labels, annotation work required to im-
plement the approach, the link with Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle, 1993), and the
conversion to triples.
4.1 Inferred Labels
In the current proposal, negation and conditional introduce new indices, that are not shown in the AMR.
These are necessary to ensure a well-formed logical structure. But they are (perhaps) not intuitive, and
therefore harder to annotate by coders. It would be useful to investigate whether these labels can be
inferred, in such a way that constraints with colons (for negation and conditionals) could be simplified.
4.2 Annotation Work
Existing AMR annotation can be monotonically extended: all “slashes” that occur in AMRs need to be
indexed, and constraints need to be added. Given an annotated AMR corpus, this can be done semi-
automatically: first add indices automatically (by replacing ”/” by ”/1/”). Then manually correct cases of
negation (search for ”:polarity -”), universal quantification, and definite descriptions, for a sample of the
corpus. Use machine learning to annotate the rest (or hire or persuade human annotators to do the job).
4.3 From AMR to DRS
A simple way of converting labelled AMRs to DRS (Discourse Representation Structure) is as follows:
replace each AMR by a DRS (this DRS contains exactly one discourse referent, one one-place predicate,
and zero or more two-place relations). Then merge all DRSs that are indexed with the same index. Then,
following the structure expressed by the constraints, deal with negation, universal quantification, and
presuppositions. The result is a semantic representation that is nearly equivalent with DRS in terms of
expressive power (nearly equivalent, because a DRS doesn’t need to contain a discourse referent, whereas
an AMR always contains a discourse referent). The appendix contains some example translations.
4.4 Triple Format of Logical Structure
AMRs are converted to sets of triples for evaluation purposes. Therefore, a sensible question to ask is
how the logical constraints in this proposal are converted to triples. The indexed sub-AMRs all introduce
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a triple linking an instance with a scope index. Each scoping constraint introduces one or more triples.
Constraints that involve two indices introduce a single triple. Constraints that involve three indices
introduce two triples. Here is an example:
“Nobody smiled.”
(e /1/ smile.v.01
:Agent (x /2/ person)) {4:2=>3,3:¬1}
This will introduce the membership triples < e , IN , 1 > and < x , IN , 2 >, the triple for negation < 3 ,
NOT , 1 >, and the triples for the implication < 4 , IF , 2 >, and < 2 , THEN , 3 >.
5 Conclusion
The original AMR notation can be extended by a layer of logical structure that gives correct interpreta-
tion of linguistic phneomena that require scope or quantification. The resulting framework bears strong
similarities with Discourse Representation Theory.
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A Example Translations
A.1 “A dog scared every cat.”
(e /1/ scare.v.01
:Stimulus (x /1/ dog.n.01)
:Experiencer (y /2/ cat.n.01)) {3:2=>1}
τ (1) =
e
scare.v.01(e)
Stimulus(e,x)
Experiencer(e,y)
⊕
x
dog.n.01(x)
=
e x
scare.v.01(e)
Stimulus(e,x)
Experiencer(e,y)
dog.n.01(x)
τ (2) =
y
cat.n.01(y)
τ (3) =
τ (2)⇒ τ (1)
=
y
cat.n.01(y)
⇒
e x
scare.v.01(e)
Stimulus(e,x)
Experiencer(e,y)
dog.n.01(x)
A.2 “Mary didn’t smile.”
(e /1/ smile.v.01
:Agent (x /2/ person.n.01
:Name (n /2/ name.n.01
:Op1 "mary"))) {2<3,3:¬1}
τ (1) =
e
smile.v.01(e)
Agent(e,x)
τ (2) =
x
person.n.01(x)
Name(x,n)
⊕
n
name.n.01(n)
Op1(n,”mary”)
=
x n
person.n.01(x)
Name(x,n)
name.n.01(n)
Op1(n,”mary”)
τ (3) =
¬τ (1)
= ¬
e
smile.v.01(e)
Agent(e,x)
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